...mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition,...contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. (4.2 / 25-6) This means that if we wish to arrive at true beliefs about objects existing in the real...

...the past. There is always room for scepticism, as the empiricist David Hume wrote: That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition,...contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. (1748/1963: section iv, 25-6, original emphasis) Hume's conclusion of his discussion of induction is...

...problem of induction is clearly expressed in one of Hume's best-known statements: "That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition...contradiction than the affirmation that it will rise" (1748/1969, p. 197). If our expectations rely on the inductive principle, but its use cannot be logically...

...mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, [than} that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood" (Hume 1902:...

...mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition...and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. Hume was fully aware of the vast implications of his position here. He pointed them out in the devastating...

...textbook of geometry. 28 ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no [26] less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more...and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. 3 It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence...