 | Peter Orebech, Fred Bosselman, Jes Bjarup, David Callies, Martin Chanock, Hanne Petersen - Law - 2005 - 440 pages
...shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than...usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connection together, and that all the... | |
 | Alan Bailey, Dan O'Brien - Philosophy - 2006 - 180 pages
...observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind [argument 'derived from the testimony of men'] is derived from no other principle than our observation...usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the... | |
 | David Hume - Philosophy - 2006 - 628 pages
...shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than...testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the report of witnesses. It being a general maxim that no objects have any discoverable connection together,... | |
 | Stephen Buckle - Philosophy - 2007 - 278 pages
...shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than...usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the... | |
 | Henry Boynton Smith, James Manning Sherwood - Presbyterianism - 1869 - 812 pages
...not equal. When we believe anything on human testimony the principle of our belief is founded on an observation of the veracity of human testimony, and...•conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Here all the •experiments and observations give a probability in favor of the truth of that to which... | |
| |
It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. 
