 | Victor Cousin - Philosophy - 1853 - 444 pages
...it alone does, or can contemplate, it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them." Where this perception is, there is knowledge: and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge." Thence follow different modes and... | |
 | John Locke - 1854 - 536 pages
...to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion or agreement, or disagreement and repugnany of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where...knowledge : and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not... | |
 | John Locke, James Augustus St. John - Language and languages - 1854 - 576 pages
...you have quoted. " My definition of knowledge stands thus: 'Knowledge seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas.' This definition your lordship dislikes, and apprehends it may be of dangerous consequence as to that... | |
 | 1854 - 664 pages
...knowledge to be " the perception of the agrcement or disagrcement of two ideas." In this alone, he says, it consists : " where this perception is, there is knowledge; and, where it is not, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge." M. Cousin has minutely... | |
 | Thomas Ebenezer Webb - Idea (Philosophy) - 1857 - 218 pages
...consideration of Locke's Theory of Knowledge. " Knowledge," says Locke, " seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our Ideas" (iv. i. 2) : a statement which has been vehemently impugned, but which in reality merely amounts to... | |
 | Thomas Ebenezer Webb - Idea (Philosophy) - 1857 - 214 pages
...consideration of Locke's Theory of Knowledge. " Knowledge," says Locke, " seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our Ideas" (iv. i. 2) : a statement which has been vehemently impugned, but which in reality merely amounts to... | |
 | Frantešek Bolelav Květ - Logic - 1857 - 104 pages
...inclusiones, similitudines et aliae." Ibid. , 5. „ — knowledge then seems to me to be nothing than perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas." Essay, book IV, chaptro l, §. 1. 6. „ — je crois qu'on peut dire que la liaison n'est autre chose,... | |
 | William Fleming - Philosophy - 1860 - 698 pages
...1 Fol , Lend.. leeH. • 8TO, Purls, 1843. • STO, Lend., 1866. ' 12mo, Tenet, 1669. KNOWLEDGE — Where this perception is, there is knowledge ; and where it is not, then, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet wo always como short of knotcledge." — Locke.1... | |
 | Thomas Wright - 1862 - 1134 pages
...KNOWLEDGE, nol'-edj, s. (AS) A clear and certain perception of that which exists, or of truth and fact ; the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of our ideas; learning; illumination of mind ; skill in anything ; acquaintance with any fact or person;... | |
 | James McCosh - Intuition - 1865 - 472 pages
...According to the view I take, perception i» knowledge. According to Locke, "Knowledge is nothing but the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy, of any of our ideas " (iv. i. 1). See King's and Reid's review of this doctrine of Locke, supra, p. 90. Hamilton says :... | |
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Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas. 
