Proceedings of the Aristotelian SocietyIncludes Report of the executive committee for 1887/88-1914/15. |
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acquainted activity actual admitted alternative analysis Analytic Psychology appears apprehended Aristotelian Society assertion author of Marmion author of Waverley aware become believe Bergson's Bertrand Russell bodily body called cognitive complex conation conception condition connection consciousness constituent Dawes Hicks distinct distinguish doctrine emotional existence experience experienced external objects external thing F. C. S. SCHILLER F. H. Bradley fact false feel follows G. E. Moore G. F. Stout hypothesis idea identity of denotation Inductive judging judgment Julius Cæsar Logic meaning mental merely metaphysical mind nature paper parallelism perceiving perception person philosophy phrase physical Plato point of view position possible Predicate present principle Prof Professor Stout proposition psychical purpose question Realism reality recognise reference regard relation Russell Scott seems sensations sense sense-data so-and-so standpoint Subjective Idealism suppose thought tion true truth and error universal whole Wildon Carr
Popular passages
Page 44 - The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon.
Page 88 - Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description.
Page 105 - The way of the continual assistance of the creator is that of the system of occasional causes ; but I hold that this is to make a Deus ex Machina...
Page 66 - ... like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection? Very true. But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure? Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.
Page 91 - Many universals, like many particulars, are only known to us by description. But here, as in the case of particulars, knowledge concerning what is known by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance. The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.
Page 213 - THE METAPHYSIC OF EXPERIENCE. Book I. General Analysis of Experience ; Book II. Positive Science ; Book III. Analysis of Conscious Action ; Book IV. The Real Universe. 4 vols. 8vo, 36s.
Page 89 - Such reference is involved in any mention of past, present, and future (as opposed to definite dates), or of here and there, or of what others have told us. Thus it would seem that, in some way or other, a description known to be applicable to a particular must involve some reference to a particular with which we are acquainted, if our knowledge about the thing described is not to be merely what follows logically from the description. For example, "the most long-lived of men...
Page 82 - I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, ie when I am directly aware of the object itself.
Page 85 - Thus self-consciousness cannot be regarded as throwing light on the question whether we can know a complex without knowing its constituents. This question, however, is not important for our present purposes, and I shall therefore not discuss it further. The awarenesses we have considered so far have all been awarenesses of particular existents, and might all in a large sense be called sense-data. For, from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is exactly on a level with...
Page 86 - Thus we must suppose that we are acquainted with the meaning of "before," and not merely with instances of it. There are thus at least two sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, particulars and universals. Among particulars I include all existents, and all complexes of which one or more constituents are existents, such as this-before-that, this-above-that, the-yellowness-of-this. Among universals I include all objects of which no particular is a constituent. Thus the disjunction "universal-particular"...