the members of the electoral college. It is a contest between two or

more men.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Within a State attention is given to the electors, and I think the fact that the popularity of the elector does enter into the results is indicated by the fact that in some States you do have some split electors, where you have different

Senator MORTON. Yes; we had in Alabama six uninstructed electors. Senator CASE of South Dakota. Now another question. Wouldn't this probably require splitting the presidential ballot from the State ballot and the congressional ballot? Here is a voter who resides in one congressional district, but, with the districts not coterminous with the congressional districts, he also has to have on his ballot the elector that he is supposed to vote for. If I live on one side of the street, and I am in one presidential district, and my neighbor lives across the street in the same congressional district but in a different presidential district, he has to have a different ballot than I would have, or there has to be some identification, or we would not know whom to vote for.

Senator MORTON. Suppose you live in a different county and you vote for sheriff, you vote for two different people.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. But the ballots today, at least in my State, are printed for each county. So there is no opportunity for the voter in one county to vote for the sheriff in another county. But here you would have to have a ballot so that the voter in X congressional district could vote in the Y presidential district.

Senator MORTON. The same thing occurs today. I cannot conceive of this thing crossing county lines in a State like yours. In New York City you have a good many-and I do not know how many-Members of Congress. Yet you all vote for mayor.

Senator KEATING. It is a different election.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. You have the same problem in a municipal election. In a municipal election, if you elect councilmen by wards, the man who lives in the first ward is not permitted to vote for the councilman who lives in the fourth ward. It seems to me that you are going to have to break your presidential ballots down so that there will be no chance of the voter voting for the wrong presidential elector.

Senator KEATING. If you would yield on that, in referring to New York City, or any large city, in New York today you have a congressional district, you have a State senatorial district, and you have a State assembly district. Now if you create an electoral district across some of those, it is going to be confusing. It is confused enough now and election officials are on the verge of nervous prostration, and if you overlap and put on top of that electoral districts, you have just compounded the thing tremendously unless they are the same as the congressional districts.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. In earlier colloquy you both agreed it would be desirable if the various pressures that operate here would result in re-forming the congressional districts so that they would be coterminous with the presidential districts and more nearly equal in population character, and so forth. There would be a very practical difficulty there based on the experience in South Dakota. Eastern South Dakota is an agricultural country very much like Minnesota or Iowa, and western South Dakota, commonly called the short grass

country, has very diverse interests. That is the reason through all the years, even though the population is three times as great for the first district as it is for the second district, the districts have divided on the Missouri River, the East River, and the West River-because of the similarity of interests within those areas. East of the river is one congressional district today. Up until 1930 we had two congressional districts east of the river and only one west of the river. "But because the interests of eastern and southern South Dakota were so much more homogenous, the two congressional districts were merged into one even though the action resulted in disparity of population. Senator KEATING. Would you yield on that?

And would not the people in the State Legislature of South Dakota rather resent the Morton-Celler idea of having the Federal Government come in and tell them: "We do not approve of the way you set up your districts. You have got to set them up some other way."

Senator CASE of South Dakota. That leads me to the point that I want to make. Article XIV of the Constitution, section 2, reads, in part:

*** But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for the President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being 21 years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crimes, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 21 years of age in such State.

We are all familiar with that. It is brought up every time the polltax question comes up, and it is repeatedly pointed out that the Congress has never enforced the provision. I would suggest to the chairman that the very thing which operated to prevent Congress from reducing the representation of the States which have prevented some people's voting the resentment of the States-would operate here.

If Congress has not, and will not, act to reduce the basis of representation for the States which have denied voting privileges, I doubt that Congress would ever successfully pressure the States to make the congressional districts coterminous with the presidential districts. Senator KEATING. They might not, and if they did not, then this would be meaningless, but if they did, it would certainly, in my judgment, be resented within the States, if they tried to do that.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, that is all I am going to ask, and I appreciate your courtesy. This makes a very good foundation for the statements which I later hope to present because I think that the resolution which I have evolved after a great deal of wrestling with this problem answers many of these questions, and, yet, achieves the objectives which Senator Morton and Senator Keating both have expressed here this morning.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Morton, do you wish to respond after the colloquy of your two Republican brethren?

Senator MORTON. I just want to see the citizens of South Dakota have as much representation as the citizens of New York.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. They have more today.

Senator KEATING. I do not think that that is an objective, but I will say Senator Mansfield's resolution gives everybody the same opportunity.

Senator KEFAUVER. We are certainly grateful to you for coming here and being with us.

Senator MORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEFAUVER. And for your enlightened presentation.
Senator MORTON. Thank you, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. The committee is delighted to have Senator Case of South Dakota, who is a great student of the problem of Federal elections, with us, and he will speak in connection with Senate. Joint Resolution 48, which is already a part of the record.

Do you have a longer statement that you would like to include in the record?

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS CASE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

Senator CASE of South Dakota. I do have a longer statement which I would like to put in the record.

Senator KEFAUVER. The written statement will be printed in the record at this point.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CASE OF SOUTH DAKOTA ON BEHALF OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 48

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we saw last fall what possibly will be the last erratic performance of the electoral college. I am hopeful that this time the determination for change is strong enough to succeed.

Governments which derive their legitimacy from expressions of the popular will through the electoral process must be grounded upon a true reflection of the popular will. Our constitutional system is held by our people to be a vehicle for the empowering of their choice of leaders as that choice is expressed in the electoral process.

The fact that a government can be empowered through the erratic and unpredictable workings of an undisciplined system of national elections in this country constitutes a menace to the legitimacy of our Government. The interjection between our citizens and their choice for President of an intermediate group who are not legally bound to elect the choice expressed by the voters constitutes a cruel perversion of what has been for well over a century the almost universally acknowledged source of power of the President of the United States-election by the people.

However, the electoral college was intended to function, we know that it is not functioning in that way. The electors are not members of their communities selected by the people as best suited to decide for whom the vote of the community should be cast. They are, instead, expected to be transmitters of the choice of the people. Despite this the electors are legally able to distort the expressed will of the people.

PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION

This situation has long been recognized. This committee is at present considering several newly offered variations of meritorious proposals which have previously been considered.

The proposals are of three basic types. The first is to make the election of President and Vice President wholly determined by the total popular vote of the Nation, abolishing the method of casting the vote for President and Vice President by State units. The second proposal is to retain the concept of voting by units, but to change the unit itself from the State to a more compact body, thereby making the unit vote more nearly reflective of the will of the people of the area. The third is to retain the State-unit system, but to divide proportionally the unit vote among the various candidates.

These proposals are not new. But they are good proposals. That they are good proposals is attested to by the fact that they have been so often disinterred."

They would each largely correct the faults at which they are aimed. But none of these proposals has ever been accepted. And they are not likely to be accepted now for the same reasons that they have not before been accepted.

INTENTIONS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS

The writers of the Constitution intended in the design of the electoral college not only to interpose between the people and the selection of the President of the United States a device to make for a wiser choice than a popularity contest might make, but they intended also to provide a protection for the smaller States and the newer States to better allow them to safeguard their interests against those of the larger States.

The Connecticut compromise, which led that Colony to join the Union, gave all States two senators, regardless of size, and based presidential electors on Senators as well as Representatives. These two electors for each State's two Senators historically gave smaller rural States some strength to offset the immigrant population that tended to cluster in cities. Since 33 of the 50 States benefit by that provision and since 37 States would have to ratify a constitutional change, it is doubtful that direct election by popular vote can be achieved regardless of what arguments may now be advanced.

Most citizens of the new States or of those whose populations are small are not prepared to surrender their strengthened status. They value this status. These States were given this status by the Constitution and there is no constitutional way of depriving them of it without the consent of many of them.

CONGRESSIONAL OR ELECTORAL DISTRICT PROPOSAL

The proposal to base the presidential election on congressional or electoral district units would deliver one electoral vote to the candidate receiving the majority of the popular vote cast in each district, with provision to make consequential victory in each State by delivering to the candidate who receives the most popular votes two additional electoral votes.

I believe that such a system would be more equitable than is our present system. There are objections, however, which I consider to be fatal to this proposal. One objection concerns unequal representation. Another concerns the gerrymander.

We all know that the people of the various congressional districts are not equally represented. Some of these districts contain three or four times the number of people who reside in others. In my own State of South Dakota under a congressional district system and in accordance with the present ap portionment, the vote of a person living on the west bank of the Missouri River would carry an influence equal to three votes of persons living on the east bank of that river. This could also be made true of electoral districts to be established by the State legislatures.

Too, and especially now after the decennial census, we are all mindful of the gerrymander. The boundaries of congressional districts are too often drawn so as to overrepresent the weight of one political party at the expense of another. I see no reason for inviting this kind of activity into the realm of the election of President and Vice President of the United States by establishing electoral districts. I do not believe that in an effort to correct one fault in our electoral process we should knowingly make provision for other faults of this magnitude.

A MODIFIED ELECTORAL PROPOSAL

The intention of Senate Joint Resolution 48 is simple. This is to abolish the electoral college but yet to retain the State-unit method of voting and to proportion the votes by each State between the candidates who receive more than one-third of the popular vote.

I believe that such a system would utilize the better features of proportional representation, the giving a voice to a substantial minority, but would prevent the extreme splintering of parties which some forms of proportional representation encourage. This is the telling objection to other proposals before Congress in previus years and again before Congress at present calling for the adaptation of some form of proportional representation to our electoral system.

The prospect of splinter parties, each representing a small percentage of the voters of the country, attempting to form governing coalitions which could well be unstable is not attractive to the American voter. This measure which I

recommend would remove such a potentiality by requiring that a party's nominee, to obtain any unit votes in a State, must attract over one-third of the popular vote.

These other proposals have been before the country at other times and have been rejected. The approval of this resolution would recognize this. It would also recognize the historical position of the States of smaller population and of the newer States, yet would give meaning in every State to the presidential election. It would avoid the throwing of a whole State bloc of votes on a paperthin margin. At the same time it would make it worth while to vote in every State since nearly all votes would then have impact on the national result.

EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION

Examples drawn from the recent presidential election and applied to the system I propose demonstrate its intention. In Illinois there was a margin of 8,858 votes between the Democrat and the Republican candidate. On the strength of these 8,000-plus votes, the 27 electoral votes representing the 44 -million voters in Illinois were cast. This 8,000-vote margin negated the 2,368,988 votes cast in Illinois for the Republican candidate. By the proposal I offer, Illinois would have divided its vote: 14 votes for the Democrat candidate to 13 votes for the Republican candidate.

A senatorial race, directly affecting only one State, is different. Such a contest is an act complete in itself, necessitating that the votes for one candidate for the Senate be nullified by the fact that another attracted more votes.

The election of a President, elected to be President of all the States, is a process of which the individual State elections are only contributory. The nullification of the losing candidate's vote must ultimately occur, but to allow this on the State level is a distortion of a fair election process. In a presidential 'election a small margin of votes in each of a few large States can swing the national election against the candidate with the most popular votes. The composite votes of the losing candidates who attract significant support in the States should carry weight nationally.

Further examples are readily cited. Hawaii cast three electoral votes for Mr. Kennedy on the strength of 115 popular votes. By the method I support, the margin would have been 2 to 1.

California, instead of casting 32 electoral votes for Mr. Nixon on the strength of 35,000 popular votes, would have divided-17 votes for the winner and 15 for the loser. The 35,000-vote plurality would have decided to whom the last 2 votes should go, not to whom the entire bloc of 32 should go.

This method of election would correct the situation in several of the States where a voter feels that, since his vote would not count anyway, there is no reason to vote. Nearly all votes cast for a major candidate would count in the national tally.

A MORE ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE POPULAR VOTE

Had this method been in effect at the time of the recent election, Mr. Kennedy would have won the election but by a much smaller margin-271 unit votes to 261. (The five unpledged votes could not have occurred and have no application.)

I am including for the record the results of the recent election for all the States had the count been computed by this method. I am also including a record of other elections of significant interest.

LESS CAMPAIGN STRAIN

Since we talk of easing the strain of the campaign on presidential candidates, we should apply this consideration to the electrical district electoral vote proposal now before the Congress.

If that measure were adopted, the campaign for the presidential elecțion would shift from the level of the State to that of the electoral district, multiplying the extent of the burden and the expense of campaigning. The character of the electoral district would then be unduly emphasized. The appeal would be directed to the more restricted interests of the district instead of to the broader interests of the State, for the presidential candidate would be the victim of those considerations important to blocs of voters in each district. The issues of the entire campaign would thereby be atomized.