Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and TestimonyBimal K. Matilal, A. Chakrabarti Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. `Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Knowing From Words | 23 |
Is There an Irreducible Mode of WordGenerated Knowledge? | 29 |
Testimony Justification and Coherence | 51 |
Testimony and Coherence | 59 |
Some Indian Themes and Theories | 69 |
Telling as Letting Know | 99 |
Against Gullibility | 125 |
Testimony Observation and Autonomous Knowledge | 225 |
Testimony and Memory | 251 |
History Testimony and Two Kinds of Scepticism | 273 |
Testimony Knowledge and Belief | 297 |
A Naiyāyika Response to a Russellian Theory | 315 |
Proper Names and Individuals | 325 |
Understanding Knowing and Justification | 347 |
Gańgeśa on SelfMentioning Words | 367 |
Other editions - View all
Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of ... Bimal K. Matilal,A. Chakrabarti No preview available - 2010 |
Common terms and phrases
Alvin Goldman argument assertion awareness causal Chakrabarti cognition competent comprehension concept of knowledge constitute cowhood Dasaratha designatum distinction doxastic responsibility epistemic perspective epistemology of testimony evidence example fact Fricker Gangesa grasp H. H. Price hearer hearing Hume Humean ical idea Indian individual inference inferential interpretation ISBN J. L. Mackie judgement justified in accepting Keith Lehrer kind Knowing from Words knowl knowledge by testimony language limitor linguistic Martians Matilal matter meaning memory Navya-Nyāya Nyaya object observation one's particular perceive perception person philosophers philosophy of language position possible PR thesis present principle problem proposition qualified question Rāma rational reductionist relation relevant reports Sanskrit say-so scepticism semantic sense sincerity Sītā someone sort sound space of reasons speaker speech act sphota suppose tell testimony-based knowledge theory things Thucydides tion told true belief trust trustworthiness truth understanding utterance word-generated
References to this book
Scripture and Knowledge: An Essay on Religious Epistemology Shlomo Biderman No preview available - 1995 |