Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony

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Bimal K. Matilal, A. Chakrabarti
Springer Science & Business Media, 1994 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 387 pages
Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge.
`Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge.
For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast.
After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other.
 

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Contents

Introduction
1
Knowing From Words
23
Is There an Irreducible Mode of WordGenerated Knowledge?
29
Testimony Justification and Coherence
51
Testimony and Coherence
59
Some Indian Themes and Theories
69
Telling as Letting Know
99
Against Gullibility
125
Testimony Observation and Autonomous Knowledge
225
Testimony and Memory
251
History Testimony and Two Kinds of Scepticism
273
Testimony Knowledge and Belief
297
A Naiyāyika Response to a Russellian Theory
315
Proper Names and Individuals
325
Understanding Knowing and Justification
347
Gańgeśa on SelfMentioning Words
367

The Role of Comprehension
163
Knowledge by Hearsay
195

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