Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic NormativityWe call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century. |
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action akrasia argued assessment B-ing belief formation blame can’t Chapter claim to know cognitive inertia conclusive ground control over belief convictions decide deliberation Descartes desire determine deterrent theory direct control doxastic epistemic norms epistemic virtues epistemology evidential evidentialist fact favour form a belief form a view higher order judgement Hume idea inconclusive evidence insist intention internalist intrinsic authority irrational irrationality Jones juridical theory justified belief knowledge Locke Locke’s matter memory and testimony motivate belief not-p one’s original belief perception practical freedom practical judgement practical norms pragmatic considerations pragmatic constraints probative force process of belief proposition Queen is dead question rational belief rational motivation rational person rationality of belief reasons for belief reductionist reflection on inconclusive Reflective Motivation reliable requires responsive to reasons sensory experience simply someone subject to reason sufficient Suppose theoretical theory of responsibility things thought true truth virtue voluntaristic