The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Volume 4Little, Brown, 1854 - Philosophy |
Contents
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Common terms and phrases
actions agreeable allowed appear approbation argument arise ascribe Athenians authority beauty benevolence body cerning character Cicero circumstances common concerning conclusions conjoined connection consequences consider contrary course of nature degree Deity derived discover dispute distinction divine endeavor entirely epic poetry Epicurus esteem evidence excite existence experience feel force former friendship give happiness Hesiod human nature ideas imagination immediately infer influence inquiry instance Jansenist Jupiter justice kind laws Malebranche mankind manner matter of fact means merit metaphysics mind miracle moral motion natural philosophy necessity never object observe operation opinion opposite origin ourselves particular passions perfect person philosophers pleasure Plutarch polytheism possessed present pretend pride principles produce qualities reason reflection regard relation relations of ideas religion render requisite rience rule scepticism seems sense sensible sentiment sion society species superstition supposed Tacitus testimony theism thing thought tion vanity vice virtue whole
Popular passages
Page 530 - Remove far from me vanity and lies: give me neither poverty nor riches ; feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the Lord? or lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my God in vain.
Page 31 - The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never...
Page 131 - That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish. And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains, after deducting the inferior.
Page 52 - Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.
Page 94 - Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English.
Page 132 - If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
Page 42 - And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life...
Page 469 - Stock, stone, or other homely pedigree, In his defence his servants are as bold As if he had been born of beaten gold. The Jewish Rabbins, though their enemies, In this conclude them honest men and wise ; For 'twas their duty, all the learned think, T" espouse his cause by whom they eat and drink.
Page 84 - One event follows another ; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely, without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.
Page 87 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.