Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic NormativityWe call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century. |
Contents
Reflection and rationality | 9 |
Motivating belief | 23 |
Knowledge and conclusive grounds | 37 |
Scepticism certainty and control | 53 |
Renouncing belief? | 71 |
Freedom and responsibility | 75 |
Freedom and the will | 77 |
Locke on freedom | 89 |
Memory and testimony | 131 |
Knowledge and its preservation | 133 |
The authority of memory | 147 |
The authority of testimony | 163 |
Epistemology as moral psychology | 177 |
Notes | 181 |
193 | |
197 | |
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action akrasia argued assessment aware belief formation blame Chapter claim to know cognitive inertia conclusive grounds control over belief convictions decide decision deliberation Descartes desire determine deterrent theory direct control doxastic epistemic norms epistemic virtues epistemology evidential evidentialist facie fact favour form a belief form a view higher order judgement Hume idea inconclusive evidence inductive insist intention internalist intrinsic authority irrational irrationality Jones judge juridical theory justified belief knowledge Locke matter memory and testimony motivate belief not-p one's original belief perception practical freedom practical judgement practical norms practical reason pragmatic considerations pragmatic constraints probative force process of belief proposition punishment Queen is dead question rational belief rational motivation rational person reasons for belief reductionist Reflective Motivation reliable requires responsive to reasons sensory experience simply someone subject to reason sufficient Suppose theoretical theory of responsibility things thought tical tion true truth virtue voluntaristic
Popular passages
Page 1 - ... all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom, and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures.