Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Volume 921Enquiry concerning the principles of morals / Hume, David, 1711-1776. |
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actions advantage agreeable allowed appear approbation argument arise ascribe Athenians authority beauty benevolence blame body cause and effect cerning character Cicero circumstances common conclusion conduct connexion consequences consider contrary course of nature DAVID HUME degree Demosthenes derived discover dispute doctrine of necessity endeavour entirely Epicurus esteem event evidence existence experience farther feel foundation give happiness human nature Hume Hume's ideas imagination immediately indifferent infer infinite divisibility influence instance interest Iphicrates Jansenist judgement justice kind laws liberty Malebranche mankind manner matter of fact merit metaphysics mind miracle moral distinctions necessity never object observe operations origin ourselves Palamedes particular passions pernicious person philosophical pleasure Plutarch Polybius possessed praise present principles produce Pyrrhonism qualities reflection regard relation religion render rules scepticism seems self-love selfish sense sensible sentiment social virtues society species supposed sympathy Tacitus testimony theory tion Treatise universal utility vice
Popular passages
Page 119 - That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish. And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior.
Page 79 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.
Page 86 - Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.
Page 155 - But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception...
Page 168 - When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Page 133 - Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure.
Page 118 - Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words a miracle, to prevent them?
Page 68 - The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means by which this is effected, the energy by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation, of this we are so far from being immediately conscious that it must forever escape our most diligent inquiry.
Page 175 - I am apt to suspect, they may, the one as well as the other, be solid and satisfactory, and that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions.
Page 46 - ... objects, heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the only one, which explains the difficulty, why we draw from, a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them.